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Sexual Assault Cases in the Supreme 




This paper forms part of a 30-year retrospective on the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1 its successes and challenges. In 
particular, I have been invited to consider the contemporary role of the 
Charter value of equality in protecting women against crimes of vio-
lence. This paper argues that section 15 of the Charter has prompted 
reforms that protect women as complainants in sexual assault cases and 
considers the effectiveness of these reforms. 
Part II supplies a history of the relationships between consent, trial 
procedure, and substantive equality in sexual assault law. I argue that 
substantive equality has had a significant effect on both substance and 
procedure. Part III examines the impact of these reforms by considering 
the extent to which substantive equality has infused judicial reasoning 
and fact determination in contested sexual assault cases. Specifically, I 
focus on the three sexual assault cases decided by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in 2011.2 By examining these cases from trial to final appeal, it is 
possible to trace the development, refinement and adoption of equality-
based reasoning about particular complainants. Analyzing Supreme Court 
                                                                                                             
 Assistant Professor, University of British Columbia Faculty of Law. This article is writ-
ten in honour of my colleague Professor Christine Boyle QC on the occasion of her retirement from 
UBC. Her contribution to legal understandings of violence against women has been enormous. 
Thank you to Susan Boyd and the anonymous reviewers of this manuscript for helpful comments on 
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1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2 R. v. A. (J.A.), [2011] S.C.J. No. 17, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 628 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “A. 
(J.A.)”]; R. v. A. (J.), [2011] S.C.J. No. 28, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 440 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “A. (J.)”]; R. v. 
H. (J.M.), [2011] S.C.J. No. 45, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 197 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “H. (J.M.)”]. 
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of Canada cases allows a consideration of reasoning that is more fully 
argued than is often possible in trial courts, and also focuses on reasoning 
that is most likely to provide a model for future cases. My analysis shows 
that substantive equality reasoning has not yet infused judicial ap-
proaches to fact determination in sexual assault cases, and that individual 
complainants are not yet fully protected against the operation of myths 
and stereotypes when consent or credibility are at stake. I suggest in 
conclusion that the Supreme Court of Canada has a leading role to play 
in moving judicial reasoning towards a more egalitarian approach to fact 
determination. 
II. CONSENT, PROCEDURE AND SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY 
While the legal questions varied, consent was the factual question at 
the heart of each of the three cases decided by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in 2011. This commonality speaks to the continued challenges of 
proof at the trial level in sexual assault. The variation in the legal 
questions brought forward to the Court demonstrates that consent raises 
both substantive questions — for example, what are the limits of con-
sent? — and procedural challenges — for example, how can the court 
focus the trier of fact on the specific question of consent in this instance, 
rather than judging sexual assault by the reputation or history of the 
complainant?3 Before turning to the specific arguments made in A. (J.A.),4 
A. (J.)5 and H. (J.M.),6 it may be helpful to introduce the substantive law 
of consent and some of the most relevant procedural aspects of sexual 
assault law, and to note the influence of section 15 of the Charter on both 
of these dimensions. 
On the substantive side, the contemporary statutory definition of 
consent was introduced into the Criminal Code7 in 1992 after broad 
consultation.8 Consent is now defined in section 273.1(1) of the Criminal 
Code to mean “the voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in 
                                                                                                             
3 On the interconnectedness of substantive and procedural law, see Christine Boyle & 
Marilyn MacCrimmon, “The Constitutionality of Bill C-49: Analyzing Sexual Assault as if Equality 
Really Mattered” (1998) 41 Crim. L.Q. 198, at 198-200 [hereinafter “Boyle & MacCrimmon”]. 
4 Supra, note 2. 
5 Supra, note 2. 
6 Supra, note 2. 
7 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
8 Boyle & MacCrimmon, supra, note 3; Lise Gotell, “Rethinking Affirmative Consent in 
Canadian Sexual Assault Law: Neoliberal Sexual Subjects and Risky Women” (2008) 41 Akron L. 
Rev. 865 [hereinafter “Gotell, ‘Rethinking Affirmative Consent’”]. 
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the sexual activity in question”. Subsection 273.1(2) sets out a variety of 
circumstances in which valid consent is not obtained, including, for 
example: incapacity to consent; expressed lack of consent; and an 
expressed desire to discontinue the activity. Section 273.2 provides that it 
is not a defence that the accused believed the complainant was consent-
ing, if the accused failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent or 
if his belief arose from self-induced intoxication, recklessness or wilful 
blindness. 
Feminist commentators hailed the 1992 definition of consent as enli-
vening the potential for “a contextual analysis of the power relations 
within which sexual interactions unfold”.9 Specifically, the definition 
imagines an exchange in which the participants take steps to ascertain 
and abide by the wishes of their partner, and the grey area between “yes” 
and “no” is correspondingly diminished. Where charges are laid, the 
Criminal Code directs the trier of fact to look for agreement rather than 
relying upon acquiescence, and particularly to consider the circum-
stances in which mere acquiescence might be more likely to have 
occurred.10 Feminists felt that the amendments responded to their 
criticisms of sexual assault law as “reflecting a pervasive distrust of 
women and children, and as facilitating male sexual access to them 
regardless of their wishes”.11 This mistrust, and the corresponding 
inadequacies in the criminal justice response to sexual violence, were 
regarded by many commentators as failures to make good on the section 
15 Charter promise that all individuals have the right to equal benefit and 
protection of the law.12 The preamble to the 1992 amendments specifi-
cally cited grave concern about the incidence of violence against women 
and children and Parliament’s intention “to promote and help to ensure 
the full protection of the rights guaranteed under section 7 and 15 of the 
[Charter]”.13 
The leading case on consent in sexual assault law is R. v. Ewan-
chuk.14 In Ewanchuk, the Supreme Court of Canada held that absence of 
                                                                                                             
9 Id., at 868. 
10 R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] S.C.J. No. 10, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ewan-
chuk”]. See also s. 265(3), which defines the circumstances in which consent is vitiated for all 
assaults. 
11 Boyle & MacCrimmon, supra, note 3, at 199. 
12 Id., at 200; see also Sheilah Martin, “Some Constitutional Considerations on Sexual 
Violence Against Women” (1994) 32 Alta. L. Rev. 535, at 547-51. 
13 Canada, House of Commons, Legislative Committee on Bill C-49, An Act to Amend the 
Criminal Code (Sexual Assault), 34th Parl., 3rd Sess., 1992 Preamble (passed by House of 
Commons June 15, 1992), cited in A. (J.), supra, note 2 (Appellant’s Factum, at para. 26). 
14 Supra, note 10. 
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consent “is subjective and determined by reference to the complainant’s 
subjective internal state of mind towards the touching, at the time it 
occurred”.15 Where an individual has said no to sexual contact: 
[t]he accused cannot rely on the mere lapse of time or the 
complainant’s silence or equivocal conduct to indicate that there has 
been a change of heart and that consent now exists, nor can he engage 
in further sexual touching to “test the waters”.16 
Furthermore, a clear assertion of “no” is not required and the trier of fact 
should focus on whether “yes” was communicated to the accused. 
Collectively, the section 273.1 definition of consent and Supreme Court 
of Canada precedent provide a strong consent standard. Consent is 
determined solely by the complainant’s state of mind; and the accused’s 
capacity to argue mistaken belief in consent is conditioned by a require-
ment to make reasonable efforts to ascertain consent. Parliament and 
some judges expressly link these standards to women and children’s 
equality rights and to the related principles of universal dignity and 
autonomy. 
A strong substantive definition of consent is most effective when 
accompanied by procedural rules that focus the court’s attention on the 
specific question of whether this complainant consented to the sexual 
activity that forms the subject of this charge. Parliament has developed 
procedural rules that are designed to protect the trial process from the 
operation of prejudicial generalizations about rape complainants.17 
Reforms were also implemented to balance complainants’ privacy and 
equality interests with the right of the accused to make full answer and 
defence.18 While early legislative efforts were ruled unconstitutional by 
the Supreme Court,19 a jurisprudence of equality gradually emerged from 
the reasoning in several cases and was explicitly adopted by a majority in 
R. v. Mills.20 For present purposes, the key aspect of this procedural law 
                                                                                                             
15 Id., at para. 26. 
16 Id., at para. 52. 
17 Sections 276 and 277 Criminal Code. 
18 This legislative history has been well canvassed elsewhere. For example, Boyle and 
MacCrimmon, supra, note 3; Margaret Denike, “Myths of Women and the Rights of Man” 
[hereinafter “Denike”] in James Frederick Hodgson & Debra S. Kelley, eds., Sexual Violence: 
Policies, Practices and Challenges in the United States and Canada (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 
at 101. 
19 R. v. Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (S.C.C.) [herein-
after “Seaboyer”]. 
20 [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mills”]. In R. v. Osolin, 
[1993] S.C.J. No. 135, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595, at para. 166 (S.C.C.), Cory J. identified the potential 
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is its focus on expelling certain unfair stereotypes about sexual assault 
complainants from the trial process. Before turning to particular stereo-
types, it is useful to consider the relationship between equality and 
stereotyping. 
Section 15 of the Charter protects substantive equality and envisages 
that all individuals should receive the equal protection and benefit of the 
law. In Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews,21 a majority of the 
Court explained: 
Recognizing that there will always be an infinite variety of personal 
characteristics, capacities, entitlements and merits among those subject 
to a law, there must be accorded, as nearly as may be possible, an 
equality of benefit and protection and no more of the restrictions, 
penalties or burdens imposed upon one than another.22 
This desire to ensure an equal allocation of burdens and protection is 
threatened by the operation of unfair stereotypes. Sophia Moreau 
describes stereotyping as a process by which one group of people treats 
another (the stereotyped group) as though certain generalizations or 
classifications capture essential features of all individuals who belong to 
the stereotyped group. Decisions made on the basis of such generaliza-
tions overlook the particular circumstances or attributes of individual 
members of the group. Such decisions violate the principle of substantive 
equality by denying individuals protection based on irrelevant considera-
tions and by denying individuals the capacity to be judged on their own 
circumstances and experience.23 The Court has emphasized “the role of 
s. 15(1) in overcoming prejudicial stereotypes in society”.24 
Turning to sexual assault, the Supreme Court first recognized the 
dangers of myths and stereotypes in R. v. Seaboyer.25 Specifically, the 
                                                                                                             
relevance of s. 15 to limiting cross-examination while stressing that it was “not determinative”; see 
also R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.), and R. v. Darrach, [2000] 
S.C.J. No. 46, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443 (S.C.C.). For further information about the pre-Mills case law, 
see: Denike, supra, note 18; Elizabeth Sheehy, “Feminist Argumentation Before the Supreme Court 
in R. v. Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme: The Sound of One Hand Clapping” (1991) 18 Melbourne U. L. Rev. 
450 [hereinafter “Sheehy”]; and John McInnes & Christine Boyle, “Judging Sexual Assault Law 
Against a Standard of Equality” (1995) 29 U.B.C. L. Rev. 341 [hereinafter “McInnes & Boyle”]. 
21 [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.). 
22 Id., at para. 26, per McIntyre J. 
23 Sophia Moreau, “The Wrongs of Unequal Treatment” in Fay Faraday, Margaret Denike 
& M. Kate Stephenson, eds., Making Equality Rights Real, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2009) 31, at 
36-37. 
24 Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 
1 S.C.R. 497, at para. 64 (S.C.C.). 
25 Supra, note 19. 
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Court identified that sexual history evidence was often admitted without 
regard to relevance, and used by triers of fact to infer consent based on 
the myths “that unchaste women were more likely to consent to inter-
course and in any event, were less worthy of belief”.26 The majority 
struck down a provision that was designed to protect sexual assault 
complainants from such generalizations as a breach of the right to make 
full answer and defence, because it was over-inclusive.27 Nonetheless, 
they accepted that trial judges should exclude sexual history evidence if 
it is irrelevant or its prejudicial potential substantially outweighs its 
probative value.28 This reasoning was confirmed, and additional myths 
identified in R. v. Osolin.29 In both cases, the Court identified concerns 
about the possibility that a rape victim’s credibility might be unfairly 
demeaned based on inaccurate generalizations about the behaviour, 
truthfulness or character of sexual assault complainants, while upholding 
the relevance of cross-examination on sexual history in the instant cases. 
Although concerns about rape myths resonate with the substantive 
equality focus on stereotyping, the Court did not explicitly connect the 
concept of rape myths with the Charter right to equality until Mills.30 
Justices McLachlin and Iacobucci held on behalf of a majority that: 
Equality concerns must also inform the contextual circumstances in 
which the rights of full answer and defence and privacy will come into 
play. In this respect, an appreciation of myths and stereotypes in the 
context of sexual violence is essential to delineate properly the 
boundaries of full answer and defence. ... [T]he right to make full 
answer and defence does not include the right to information that would 
only distort the truth-seeking goal of the trial process.31 
After Mills, the connection between substantive equality and excluding 
stereotyping from sexual assault cases is clear. Banishing unfair stereo-
typing from sexual assault cases is characterized as protecting both 
women’s equality and the truth-seeking functions of the trial.32 This dual 
benefit becomes apparent when one focuses on the distorting effects that 
arise when a trier of fact substitutes an unfair generalization about human 
                                                                                                             
26 Id., at para. 23. 
27 The majority’s failure to have regard to complainants’ equality rights was widely criti-
cized. See, for example, Sheehy, supra, note 20; McInnes & Boyle, supra, note 20, at 365-66. 
28 Seaboyer, supra, note 19. 
29 Supra, note 20. 
30 Supra, note 20. 
31 Id., at 727 S.C.R., para. 90. 
32 Id.; see also R. v. B. (W.), [2000] O.J. No. 2184, 145 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at para. 146 (Ont. 
C.A.). 
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behaviour for a careful consideration of what happened on this occasion. 
Concerns about unjust acquittals are front and centre in this regard. 
Far less clear is how best to identify and avoid reasoning which is 
based on stereotype. Christine Boyle and Marilyn MacCrimmon explain 
that the risk of stereotyping arises when a trier of fact moves from 
proven fact to an inference about consent or credibility by way of a 
generalization. Before inferences are drawn, “the question should be 
whether the underlying generalization is misleading, discriminatory, and 
one that should be eliminated from the fact determination process.”33 
However, a close analysis of the Supreme Court’s 2011 decisions 
demonstrates that trial and appellate courts continue to find it difficult to 
avoid stereotyped reasoning in sexual assault cases. While equality has 
informed the substantive definition of consent, and legislative reforms 
have improved aspects of trial procedure, attention to equality has not yet 
thoroughly infused trial practice or appellate reasoning. Interestingly, this 
failure is not caused by an absence of legal tools, or a lack of helpful 
precedent. Rather, the equality reasoning that characterized legislative 
reforms and judicial decisions during the 1990s seems to have been 
marginalized within more recent trial practice and judicial decisions. In 
the next section, I examine the three sexual assault decisions rendered by 
the Court in 2011, and identify the persistent influence of prejudicial 
generalizations about sexual assault complainants. 
III. LOOKING FOR SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY IN THE SEXUAL 
ASSAULT CASES DECIDED BY THE SUPREME COURT IN 2011 
The three sexual assault cases decided by the Supreme Court of Can-
ada in 2011 share some common features. Each alleged sexual assault 
took place in the context of a pre-existing family relationship. Each trial 
turned on the question of consent. Each case was tried by judge alone, 
and a written decision rendered, and so it is possible to investigate the 
factual reasoning that led to the verdict. The cases also differ legally and 
factually. I have already noted that various questions were brought to the 
Court on appeal. In two cases, the alleged violence occurred between 
spouses, and in one of these the relationship was in the course of being 
dissolved. In one case, the complainant alleged that she was sexually 
assaulted by her cousin. In this section, I address the cases in the order in 
                                                                                                             
33 Boyle & MacCrimmon, supra, note 3, at 232. This article was cited with approval in R. v. 
Darrach, supra, note 20, at paras. 33-34. 
302 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2012), 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
which they were decided by the Court and identify some of the key 
themes in each. 
1. R. v. A. (J.A.) 
JAA and the complainant were married, but in the process of separat-
ing. The complainant alleged that JAA sexually assaulted her one 
morning when the children were at school and she was due at work. JAA 
admitted to the sexual activity, but testified that it was consensual. The 
complainant testified that, when the assault commenced, she bit JAA on 
his middle finger “as hard as I could”. A police officer testified at trial 
that, although he was not an expert in bite mark analysis, he had identi-
fied and photographed a possible tooth mark on the accused’s index 
finger. The trial judge relied on this and other evidence in convicting 
JAA. 
After conviction, the defence obtained expert evidence from a foren-
sic odontologist that the relevant mark could not have been made by a 
tooth. This evidence formed the basis of a fresh evidence application 
which was rejected by the Ontario Court of Appeal but accepted by the 
Supreme Court of Canada. At trial and on appeal, JAA argued that the 
complainant had a motive to fabricate her allegations because she was 
facing the loss of her marital home and the obligation to pay an equaliza-
tion settlement to the accused.34 The accused also relied upon the 
complainant’s failure to try to escape the alleged sexual assault or call for 
help and on the absence of physical injuries to the complainant.35 The 
Crown framed this appeal as one that engaged squarely with the chal-
lenges of prosecuting sexual assault: “This case revolves around a 
perennially-vexing area of law – the paucity of corroborating evidence 
that often exists in the ‘she said, he said’ arena of sexualized violence.”36 
The Court upheld JAA’s appeal on the basis that the fresh evidence 
could reasonably have affected the outcome at trial. Characterizing the 
case as “a close one”, Charron J. held on behalf of the majority that the 
bite mark evidence was important to the trial judge, and that it was 
proper to look for corroboration given that the accused’s testimony 
                                                                                                             
34 A. (J.A.), supra, note 2 (Appellant’s Factum, at paras. 7, 29). 
35 Id., at paras. 18, 22. 
36 Id. (Respondent’s Factum, at para. 1). 
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appeared plausible.37 Justice Charron suggested that the complainant’s 
version of the events suffered from identifiable weaknesses: 
It also seems implausible that the appellant, who had never been 
depressed, violent, or aggressive in the 19 years the parties spent 
together, suddenly turned into the suicidal, violent rapist described by 
the complainant.38 
A strong dissent was issued by Rothstein J. (Deschamps J. concur-
ring). Justice Rothstein considered that, even if the fresh evidence were 
believed, it could not have affected the outcome at trial. He suggested 
that fresh evidence must be considered in the context of other evidence 
adduced at the original trial, and concluded that the trial judge’s finding 
that the accused was not capable of belief was supported by considerable 
evidence. Justice Rothstein engaged directly with a number of the 
propositions relied upon by the defence and by Charron J. to cast doubt 
on the complainant’s version of events. The defence suggested that the 
complainant’s decision to leave the house without showering or changing 
her clothes in order to preserve evidence but taking time to get her shoes 
and sunglasses “jarred somewhat” with her reportedly hysterical de-
meanour soon afterwards. Justice Rothstein observed in response to this 
argument: 
The fact that she fled the scene of the sexual assault and the accused 
without taking time to clean herself up is entirely consistent with the 
conclusion that she had just been sexually assaulted and wanted to 
escape from her attacker.39 
Engaging directly with Charron J.’s observation that the complainant’s 
version of events was improbable, Rothstein J. wrote 
I cannot agree. In addition to the findings of the trial judge I would add 
the following. The undisputed evidence is that for some years this 
couple had sexual relations twice a year, once on the accused’s birthday 
and once in the summer; hardly suggestive of a spontaneous, passionate 
advance by the complainant on June 8, 2007.40 
Countering Charron J.’s suggestion that the alleged suicide threats were 
out of character, Rothstein J. pointed out that the complainant testified in 
                                                                                                             
37 Id., at paras. 10, 12, per Charron J. 
38 Id., at para. 14. 
39 Id., at para. 39, per Rothstein J. 
40 Id., at para. 54. Paragraph 55 lists further reasons for finding the accused’s account 
implausible. 
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detail to similar threats made by the accused from the time that separa-
tion was first raised. Justice Rothstein concluded these threats “were 
made to intimidate and cause distress to the complainant”.41 Accordingly, 
Rothstein J. would have upheld the accused’s conviction. 
Justice Rothstein’s dissent demonstrates the potential for a context-
driven analysis to facilitate substantive equality. It is implicit within his 
reasoning that the majority was too quick to move from the fact that JAA 
did not have a bite mark on his finger to the conclusion that the com-
plainant’s credibility was thereby impugned to the extent of requiring a 
new trial. Instead, Rothstein J. conducted a close analysis of the remain-
ing evidence and the trial judge’s findings. Unlike the majority, Rothstein 
J. provided a thorough analysis of the context of the alleged assault: the 
breakdown of marriage and the complainant’s alleged motive to remove 
the accused from the house. He explained why these circumstances 
supported the complainant’s account rather than undermining it.42 Such 
attention to context in the application of universal legal rules about 
consent, credibility and reasonable doubt affords a potential corrective to 
the prejudicial generalizations that threaten sexual assault trials. 
Justice Charron made no reference to JAA’s arguments that the com-
plainant had a motive to fabricate her allegations, but focused on the 
difficulties of deciding guilt in the face of two conflicting accounts. 
However, neither judgment engaged in detail with how W. (D.) directions 
on reasonable doubt should be applied in a he said/she said case.43 Justice 
Charron approved of the trial judge’s efforts to resolve the credibility 
contest with physical corroborating evidence. This reasoning may be 
misunderstood as a suggestion that it is (at best) risky to convict an 
accused who testifies to consensual sexual activity in the absence of 
corroborating evidence supporting non-consent. If such a principle were 
re-enlivened, it would perpetuate the ideas that particular skepticism 
should be reserved for sexual assault complainants, and that real rape 
involves physical injury, and would be inconsistent with efforts to secure 
substantive equality.44 However, such myths may prove resilient because, 
                                                                                                             
41 Id., at para. 57. 
42 Neither judgment refers to research that shows that intimate violence frequently occurs 
for the first time or escalates during a relationship breakdown. See, for example, Douglas A. 
Brownridge, “The Elevated Risk for Non-Lethal Post-Separation Violence in Canada” (2008) 23:1 
J.I.V. 117. 
43 Although Rothstein J. approved the trial judge’s approach in this case. See further Chris-
tine Boyle, “Reasonable Doubt in Credibility Contests: Sexual Assault and Sexual Equality” (2009) 
13:4 I.J.E.P. 269. 
44 This reasoning is also expressly disapproved by s. 274 of the Criminal Code. 
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as Charron J. identified, they provide an attractive way to resolve 
credibility battles about consent in these most difficult cases. The longing 
for a straightforward rule by which to determine consent and credibility 
is echoed in A. (J.). 
2. R. v. A. (J.) 
In A. (J.), a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that 
a person cannot validly consent to sexual activity that is expected to 
occur while he or she is unconscious. A. (J.) has received considerable 
attention, in part because of its interpretation of consent and perhaps also 
because it has been recast as being concerned with the acceptable limits 
of “kinky sex” within a consensual adult relationship. However, while 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s reasoning extends to any sexual touching 
that occurs when one party is unconscious, the factual context of A. (J.) 
offers considerable reason to doubt the aptness of the kinky sex frame. 
The complainant and accused were cohabiting, and had a young son. 
The complainant provided a statement to police that the accused had 
strangled her into unconsciousness before penetrating her anus with a 
dildo. She told police that she had not consented to the strangulation or 
the anal penetration. At trial, the complainant testified that she consented 
to the strangulation and that she and the accused had discussed anal sex 
and expressed an interest in it. She also testified that when she regained 
consciousness, she went along with the anal penetration “in the spirit of 
experimentation”. On cross-examination, she agreed that she and the 
accused had once previously had consensual anal sex. 
Justice Nicholas convicted the accused on the basis that she was sat-
isfied that the complainant did not consent to the anal penetration. She 
also held that the complainant could not, in any event, validly consent to 
sexual touching expected to occur while she was unconscious. Justice 
Nicholas described the cross-examination of the complainant as follows: 
She was a most compliant witness and agreed to virtually each defence 
suggestion put to her. Few of her answers were unprompted. To that 
extent this was a typical cross-examination of a recanting complainant 
in a domestic matter.45 
Justice Nicholas’s concerns about the complainant’s testimony become 
clearer when one reads the sentencing judgment. JA had a lengthy and 
                                                                                                             
45 R. v. A. (J.), [2008] O.J. No. 1583, 2008 ONCJ 195, at para. 8 (Ont. C.J.). 
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violent criminal record. He had committed three prior assaults on this 
complainant, as well as other threatening behaviour towards her. Justice 
Nicholas expressed concern that the complainant’s behaviour “fit well 
with the profile of a battered woman”.46 JA appealed against his convic-
tion, arguing that it was not open to Nicholas J. to find that the complain-
ant did not consent, and that valid consent could be given to sexual 
activity expected to occur while a complainant was unconscious. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal held unanimously that the evidence at 
trial was not capable of supporting a finding beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the complainant did not consent.47 Justice Simmons (Juriansz J.A. 
concurring) held that the trial judge erred in holding that a person cannot 
consent in advance to sexual activity expected to occur when uncon-
scious. Confining Ewanchuk to the circumstance in which a complainant 
is conscious,48 Simmons J.A. held that permitting advanced consent is 
consistent with the goals of protecting bodily integrity and autonomy in 
sexual relationships.49 Justice LaForme dissented on this point, holding 
that Ewanchuk requires a conscious complainant because it measures 
consent by the state of mind of the complainant at the time of the sexual 
activity.50 
The Crown appealed as of right on the question of whether advanced 
consent could be given to sexual activity that occurs when one party is 
unconscious. The Crown argued for a nuanced approach to the concept of 
autonomy within sexual assault: 
In the context of sexual activity the concept of consent ought not to be 
informed by a narrow liberal interpretation of autonomy, referenced 
primarily by freedom from state interference in the expression of 
sexuality. Rather the concept of consent ought to be given content that 
is consistent with Charter values of dignity and equality, as well as 
autonomy, and a recognition of the social reality in which choice is 
constructed in specific types of human interaction.51 
The Crown sought to draw on equality reasoning in delineating auton-
omy. It pressed the proposition that one must have regard to social 
context in order to understand the complex interplay between choice, 
                                                                                                             
46 [2008] O.J. No. 4814, 2008 ONCJ 624, at para. 12 (Ont. C.J.). 
47 R. v. A. (J.), [2010] O.J. No. 1202, 253 C.C.C. (3d) 153, at paras. 55-60 and 114 (Ont. 
C.A.), per Simmons J.A. (Juriansz J.A. concurring) and LaForme J.A., respectively. 
48 Id., at paras. 74-76. 
49 Id., at para. 66. 
50 Id., at paras. 116-117, per LaForme J.A. 
51 A. (J.), supra, note 2 (Appellant’s Factum, at para. 4). 
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constraint and consent in intimate relationships. More particularly, the 
Crown identified concerns about sexual and physical abuse and dispari-
ties of economic and emotional power as factors that render liberal 
conceptions of autonomy problematic.52 
The Crown’s approach was echoed and elaborated by the Women’s 
Legal Education and Action Fund (“LEAF”) in its intervener’s factum. 
Unlike the Crown, LEAF relied on the factual context of this case to 
strengthen the argument against recognizing advanced consent.53 LEAF 
questioned whether the complainant in this case did, in fact, consent.54 
LEAF also identified that some women — particularly Aboriginals and 
disabled women — are disproportionately likely to be subjected to sexual 
assault, including assaults that occur when the complainant is uncon-
scious. LEAF suggested that this social reality should inform the Court’s 
approach to defining the limits of consent. A second intervener, the 
federal Attorney General, set out its preferred approach to the statutory 
interpretation of section 273.1 and argued that the value of protecting 
individuals who are incapacitated or abused outweighs the freedom of a 
small number who may choose to engage in dangerous activity.55 
The respondent, JA, characterized this complainant as having agreed 
to the charged activity, and this case as being “about real, communicated, 
actual consent”.56 JA suggested that it would be “heavy handed” to 
criminalize all unconscious sexual touching, including mundane contact 
between loving couples, in order to protect against “some rare theoretical 
case” of sexual abuse.57 Reading the four factums filed in this case, one 
is struck by the profoundly different framings given to the facts. While 
the Crown did not challenge the Court of Appeal’s ruling on factual 
consent, its factum is haunted by the spectre of domestic violence. In 
LEAF’s factum, this spectre becomes more substantial by the reintroduc-
tion of key facts from trial and through references to the empirical 
realities of domestic violence and sexual assault. Concerns about 
protecting women from abuse thereby became a very present dynamic in 
this case. In stark contrast, according to the respondent’s factum, the 
complainant was an enthusiastic and equal participant in sexual experi-
                                                                                                             
52 Id., at para. 6. 
53 Id. (Intervener’s Factum (Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund), at para. 3). 
54 Id., at para. 21. I will return to this question below. 
55 Id. (Intervener’s Factum (Attorney General of Canada), at para. 1). 
56 Id. (Respondent’s Factum, at para. 6). 
57 Id., at para. 62. 
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mentation who is at risk of being denied “the right to make free 
choices”.58 
A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that advanced con-
sent to sexual touching cannot remain valid after unconsciousness. Chief 
Justice McLachlin’s reasoning was grounded in statutory interpretation 
of section 273.1 of the Code: “Parliament defined consent in a way that 
requires the complainant to be conscious throughout the sexual activity 
in question.”59 Chief Justice McLachlin identified a number of practical 
difficulties inherent in permitting advanced consent and emphasized the 
unique factors that differentiate consent in sexual assault from the rules 
that shape the limits of consent in other areas of the law. 
Justice Fish wrote in dissent, Binnie and LeBel JJ. concurring. 
Adopting a formal liberal account of autonomy, Fish J. framed the case 
as one in which the Court was invited to find that “yes in fact means no 
in law.”60 He criticized the Crown and implicitly the majority reasoning 
for limiting women’s autonomy by removing the choice to engage in 
consensual sexual activity.61 Relying on the proposition that the com-
plainant was “a willing and enthusiastic participant”, Fish J. considered 
that JA should be acquitted.62 
Comparing the factums filed in A. (J.) with the reasoning in the ma-
jority and dissenting judgments, it becomes apparent that the Court took 
a relatively narrow view of the case, and that the dissent in particular 
perpetuates some of the myths associated with sexual assault. I have 
already noted that the trial judge disbelieved much of the complainant’s 
testimony on cross-examination, including her assent that she had 
previously engaged in consensual anal sex. Taking this view was, of 
course, within Nicholas J.’s preserve as trial judge and primary finder of 
fact. The Court of Appeal’s holding that it was not open to the trial judge 
to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt about non-consent does not 
disturb Nicholas J.’s conclusion about the credibility of the complainant’s 
testimony on cross-examination. Justice Fish’s strong assertions about 
the facts of A. (J.) sit uneasily with this trial record. According to Fish J., 
“the complainant in this case said yes, not no,”63 the complainant “freely 
                                                                                                             
58 Id., at paras. 6-7. 
59 A. (J.), supra, note 2, at para. 33, per McLachlin C.J.C. 
60 Id., at para. 71, per Fish J. (emphasis in original). 
61 Id., at para. 116. 
62 Id., at paras. 112-114. 
63 Id., at para. 69. 
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consented”,64 she “agreed in advance”,65 “[t]his is not a case about a 
woman who said no — at any time.”66 While Fish J. elsewhere discusses 
the importance of the Crown’s burden of proof, it is not apparent from 
the context of the passages from which these quotes are drawn that the 
record in this case is ambiguous, and that the benefit of doubt regarding 
consent was therefore given to JA. Underlying Fish J.’s emphatic 
characterization of the complainant as a willing partner lies the logic that 
if the Crown does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the com-
plainant withheld consent, she must in fact have consented. This simpli-
fication perpetuates the misconception that when an accused is acquitted 
of sexual assault, it is necessarily because the complainant lied. 
Justice Fish’s decision also reproduces a liberal account of the 
privacy of sexual choices, and reasserts the proposition that the key 
dynamic of concern in a case such as A. (J.) is between the accused and 
the State. In advancing this point, Fish J. adopted a paraphrased version 
of Pierre Trudeau’s famous remark that “there’s no place for the state in 
the bedrooms of the nation.”67 Within Fish J.’s articulation, potential 
complainants are allied with accused: they are the loving spouse who 
requests a goodbye kiss in the morning, or the woman whose autonomy 
is perfected by freely agreeing to unconventional sexual practices.68 This 
reasoning denies the recognition in Mills that sexual assault complain-
ant’s equality, privacy and dignity may often be in tension with the 
accused person’s Charter rights.69 It similarly overlooks feminist obser-
vations that norms regarding the privacy of the marital home often 
operate to conceal gendered violence from official notice.70 
Chief Justice McLachlin’s decision is also less concerned with facts 
other than the finding that JA was briefly unconscious. While a nuanced 
conception of autonomy is implicit within the finding that an uncon-
scious complainant cannot withdraw consent and therefore cannot give 
                                                                                                             
64 Id., at para. 81. 
65 Id., at para. 89. 
66 Id., at para. 112 (emphasis in original). 
67 The Honourable Pierre Trudeau, Justice Minister (as he then was), quoted in “Trudeau’s 
Omnibus Bill: Challenging Canadian Taboos” CBC TV clip (December 21, 1967), online: CBC 
<http://archives.cbc.ca/politics/rights_freedoms/topics/538/>. See id., at para. 116. 
68 See further Lise Gotell, “Governing Heterosexuality through Specific Consent: Interro-
gating the Governmental Effects of R. v. J.A.” 24 C.J.W.L. (forthcoming in 2012) [hereinafter 
“Gotell, ‘Governing Heterosexuality’”]. 
69 Mills, supra, note 20. 
70 See, for example, Susan B. Boyd, ed., Challenging the Public/Private Divide: Feminism, 
Law, and Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997); Regina Graycar & Jenny 
Morgan, The Hidden Gender of Law, 2d ed. (Sydney: Federation Press, 2002). 
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valid consent, the majority’s reasoning is predicated on the statutory 
language. However, as Fish J. showed, the majority interpretation of 
sections 273.1 and 273.2 is not unassailable. By emphasizing the 
indefeasibility of conscious, continuous and willing consent, McLachlin 
C.J.C.’s decision is consistent with the outcome that would be indicated 
by the principles of substantive equality as it protects women’s capacity 
to choose when to say yes and when to withdraw their agreement to 
sexual activity, and prevents behaviour that has been closely linked with 
domestic violence. Nonetheless, the majority reasoning does not draw 
explicitly on these substantive equality principles as do the arguments 
advanced by the Crown and LEAF in their respective factums. Substan-
tive equality seems to be relegated to a second-order principle that comes 
into play when the more conventional tools of statutory interpretation 
and stare decisis have failed to resolve a legal question. It would be a 
shame if this implicit prioritization reflects the approach that the Court is 
now taking to substantive equality in sexual assault.71 
The Seaboyer/Osolin/Mills focus on myths and stereotypes went be-
yond defining the limits of the substantive law and into the messier 
questions of proof and fact determination. In a case such as A. (J.), 
substantive equality seems to demand a contextual inquiry into the power 
differentials and difficulties of proof that justify a strong definition of 
consent.72 Unfortunately, the Crown did not seek leave to appeal the 
Court of Appeal’s decision regarding factual consent. It is strongly 
arguable that no consent was given, according to the statutory standard. 
The complainant’s evidence was that she consented to being choked into 
unconsciousness, that she and JA had discussed anal penetration and 
tried it on one prior occasion, and that she went along with the penetra-
tion when she regained consciousness. They had not talked about what 
would occur this time. Taking this evidence at its highest, it seems to fall 
short of the requirement that the complainant subjectively consent to “the 
sexual activity in question”. The only relevance of prior anal intercourse 
                                                                                                             
71 Chief Justice McLachlin’s decision in R. v. I. (D.A.), [2012] S.C.J. No. 5, 280 C.C.C. (3d) 
127 (S.C.C.) offers another example of a judgment that accords with substantive equality outcomes 
without using substantive equality reasoning. In I. (D.A.), the Court held that the statutory 
requirements for testimonial competence of an intellectually disabled adult witness focus on the 
witness’s practical understanding of the difference between truth and lies, and not on an abstract 
understanding of the concept of truth. While adverting to the policy considerations in favour of 
facilitating prosecution of sexual assaults committed on intellectually disabled victims, the Court 
predicated its decision on statutory interpretation and did not discuss the equality rights of these 
victims nor their particular vulnerability to stereotyping. 
72 The only (indirect) allusion to this proposition may be found in A. (J.), supra, note 2, at 
para. 65, per McLachlin C.J.C. 
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is the prohibited inference that she was therefore more likely to have 
consented on this occasion. The complainant’s decision to go along with 
the penetration cannot retroactively alter the terms of her consent prior to 
that time. Given the very real concerns about domestic violence in this 
case, there is all the more reason to subject this evidence to a careful 
contextual analysis and to make a self-conscious effort to avoid prejudi-
cial generalizations when reasoning through consent. 
All of this evidence became irrelevant, of course, once McLachlin 
C.J.C. concluded that advanced consent was not possible. Nonetheless, 
the Court of Appeal’s reasoning on factual consent seems to me to depart 
from the high standard established in the Criminal Code. This departure 
may indicate how difficult it can be to retain one’s focus on the particular 
charged sexual activity, and to avoid reasoning according to prejudicial 
generalizations about sexual relationships. The very human tendency to 
substitute the answer to an easier question (she was seemingly willing to 
try anal sex and had once done so) for detailed engagement with a harder 
question (had she consented to this activity on this occasion?) may help 
to explain the persistence of myths and stereotypes in this field.73 
Furthermore, incorporating the difficulties associated with consent on 
these facts may have strengthened McLachlin C.J.C.’s reasoning regard-
ing the policy basis for limiting consent to a conscious complainant by 
demonstrating the risks of domestic violence and coercion that accom-
pany asphyxiation, in particular.74 
3. R. v. H. (J.M.) 
The complainant and accused in this case were cousins. At the time 
of the alleged sexual assault, the complainant was 17 years old and the 
accused five years older. On this occasion, a number of friends were 
present at the accused’s house, and the complainant became somewhat 
drunk. The complainant went to sleep in JMH’s bed. The complainant 
testified that over her protests, JMH had sexual intercourse with her. She 
washed, stayed awake until early the next morning, then woke her sister 
and went home. The complainant wrote a poem about the incident, which 
she posted on a website, and which was reproduced in the trial judgment. 
                                                                                                             
73 See Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 2011), at 
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74 See further, Gotell, “Governing Heterosexuality”, supra, note 68. 
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A second alleged assault occurred some months later. She did not report 
the alleged assaults for some time. 
The accused testified. He denied both incidents, and denied all sex-
ual contact with the complainant. The complainant’s sister also testified. 
Her account of the morning after the first alleged assault was inconsistent 
with that given by the complainant. The trial judge observed about this 
inconsistency: “That evidence ... makes me wonder how many times S. 
was at this home. How many times did she end up in Mr. H.’s bed?”75 
While disbelieving the accused’s testimony, the trial judge had further 
concerns about the poem written by the complainant. He analyzed 
several passages from the poem, concluding that it was in some respects 
inconsistent with the experience and emotions of a rape victim. Given its 
centrality to the appeal, the relevant passage of the trial reasons is worth 
quoting at length: 






Hardly the words that describe a rape. Hardly the words that describe 
an incident that is so damaging to her that she cannot cope with it. But 
she doesn’t end there. She says, 
Evil invading 
Her body. 
It’s too late 
Regret 
“Regret”? “Regret” conjures an image of someone who has made a 
decision and wishes she had not made it. “Regret”. Why should she 
regret if she has been raped? Why should she regret if she has been 
violated? And why did she insist in going back to the same bed that she 
had been violated in? She may be young, but she is 17. 
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I suspect very strongly, when I read her poem, “First taste So 
bittersweet”, that she was confused, that she wrestled with going into 
that room. She said she went to the bed on her own and it wasn’t even 
discussed. Why?76 
The trial judge held that he was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the complainant did not consent to the sexual activity. The Crown 
appealed, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, 
including by interpreting some passages from the poem in isolation from 
the rest of the evidence. Justice Watt held for a unanimous Court that it is 
an error of law to take an incorrect approach to the evidence and that, in 
this case, the reasons suggest that the trial judge determined consent on a 
“partial evidentiary predicate”.77 As consent must be determined subjec-
tively, the poem should have been considered as a whole and in light of 
the complainant’s testimony. Justice Watt would have sent the case back 
to be retried. JMH obtained leave to appeal. 
Before the Supreme Court of Canada, JMH argued that any error in 
interpreting the poem was not an error in law and that the trial judgment 
did not support the conclusion that the trial judge disregarded the 
complainant’s testimony or the balance of the poem. The Crown argued 
that the trial judge failed to consider the extracts from the poem in their 
entire context, including the complainant’s testimony. The Crown 
suggested that, had the trial judge considered this context, he would have 
considered the possibility that the emotions described in the poem “were 
consistent not only with experimentation, but also with being the victim 
of a sexual assault by a trusted member of one’s family”.78 
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the appeal and reinstated 
JMH’s acquittal. Justice Cromwell held that a failure to apprehend the 
evidence would constitute an error of law if it resulted from a piecemeal 
approach, but concluded that the reasons given in this case did not 
disclose such an error. He suggested that Watt J.A.’s conclusion that the 
trial judge’s decision was based on two brief extracts from the poem was 
not based on a fair reading of the trial judge’s reasons.79 
The decision in H. (J.M.) is very brief. To the extent that it supports 
the need for a complete analysis of the evidence, it certainly leaves room 
for a substantive equality analysis to inform a trial judge’s reasoning. 
However, the Court’s reasoning does not suggest that a trier of fact 
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78 H. (J.M.), supra, note 2 (Respondent’s Factum, at para. 43). 
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should follow any specific logic in reaching a verdict or reiterate that 
inferences must be tested against the risk of engaging myths and stereo-
types. Returning to the facts of H. (J.M.), this feels like a missed oppor-
tunity. As the Crown asserted, the question of what inferences may be 
drawn from a poem or other evidence is conditioned by context. In this 
case, the Crown suggested a plausible alternative interpretation of the 
complainant’s poem but it too failed to make direct reference to the 
requirements of substantive equality. 
What could attention to substantive equality have added to H. (J.M.)? 
First, it might have shed light on the importance of the trial judge’s 
conclusion that the complainant had slept in JMH’s bedroom on other 
occasions. If this were so, it does not speak to whether JMH and the 
complainant had ever engaged in consensual sexual activity. Even less 
can it tell us whether the complainant consented on the charged occa-
sions. The trial judge’s reasoning implies that a teenaged girl who sleeps 
in her male cousin’s bed must know and accept the risk that he will make 
sexual overtures. Or, more bluntly, that by entering JMH’s bedroom, the 
complainant consented to intercourse. Lise Gotell has argued that 
Canadian judicial discourses posit an ideal rape victim who takes active 
steps, but fails, to protect herself against sexual assault. Women and girls 
who do not take such steps are at risk of being denied the law’s protec-
tion, regardless of whether they were capable of protecting themselves in 
the expected manner.80 Unfortunately, the Crown did not argue this line 
in H. (J.M.), and neither appeal decision critically considers the trial 
judge’s reasoning on this point. 
Second, sustained attention to substantive equality may have sup-
plied the context within which it might make sense for a rape victim to 
feel regret about a sexual assault, and to use the word “bittersweet” to 
describe a non-consensual encounter. The Crown argued this proposition 
in its factum.81 Justice Cromwell did not engage with it, except to 
observe that the trial reasons disclose that the trial judge considered all of 
the relevant evidence before finding a reasonable doubt. If the judicial 
expulsion of myths and stereotypes from sexual assault trials is to be 
effective, however, appeal courts must be willing to engage with the 
factual reasoning of trial judges. In H. (J.M.), before concluding that the 
poem’s words and the complainant’s behaviour were capable of raising a 
reasonable doubt, the Court should have considered whether the infer-
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ences necessary to sustain that doubt were based solely, or primarily, on 
myths about how an ideal victim avoids sexual assault and responds to 
the experience of being assaulted. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There has been a considerable evolution in the law and trial process 
of sexual assault, and the effects of this evolution can be seen in the 
Supreme Court’s 2011 caseload. We have moved beyond the rule that 
there can be no rape in marriage, Crown prosecutors are willing to lay 
charges in this context, and delay in disclosure is no longer as high a bar 
to prosecution. Feminist-influenced reforms have helped to protect 
complainants from some of the worst excesses of cross-examination. The 
Mills proposition that equality and privacy rights must be balanced 
against the accused’s fair trial rights instantiates a paradigm shift in 
traditional conceptions of the criminal trial as a battle between an individ-
ual accused and the powerful mechanisms of the State. Nonetheless, trial 
and appeal judges have found it difficult to fulfil the potential of equality 
reasoning, particularly when considering consent and credibility. 
Close analysis of the cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada 
in 2011 demonstrates the resilience of prejudicial reasoning about sexual 
assault complainants. In A. (J.) and H. (J.M.), the (contested) sexual 
history between the accused and complainant was recruited to discredit 
the complainant’s assertion that she did not consent. In A. (J.A.) and 
A. (J.), the notion that women fabricate sexual assault complaints to gain 
a strategic advantage on separation underpinned defence arguments and 
some judges’ reasoning. In A. (J.A.) and H. (J.M.), a reasonable doubt 
was seemingly founded in part on the lack of corroboration of the 
complainant’s story. In H. (J.M.), that doubt was strengthened by 
reasoning about how women and girls react to sexual assault, and how 
they should protect themselves against it. All of these cases rely to some 
extent on the proposition that women consent to sexual activity before 
being prompted by regret or vengeance to fabricate allegations of sexual 
assault. Closer attention to substantive equality in each of these cases 
might help contest some or many of these stereotypes. 
As we might expect, the Supreme Court cases are also unrepresenta-
tive of sexual assault in some ways. For example, none of these com-
plainants is identified as Aboriginal — and yet there is considerable 
reason to believe that Aboriginal women are disproportionately vulner-
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able to sexual assault. No generalizations can be drawn from these cases 
about the cultural sensitivity of police investigation or the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, both of which have been subject to criticism 
elsewhere.82 The cases do not allow me to investigate the possibility that 
women who are multiply marginalized may face an even more difficult 
time establishing their credibility at trial. In short, while these cases 
provide a glimpse of the continued threat that gendered stereotypes 
present to the contemporary practice of sexual assault law, they say 
nothing about the compounding effect of race. 
Twenty-seven years of equality have brought considerable positive 
advances in sexual assault law and practice. The tools to support equal-
ity-based reasoning are already largely present in the Criminal Code and 
case law. Reviewing contemporary cases suggests that the next challenge 
is to weave attention to substantive equality more fully into the fact 
determination and reasoning practices of lawyers, trial judges and 
appellate courts.83 The Supreme Court has an important role to play in 
modelling equality reasoning given the importance and impact of its 
decisions and the extent to which its cases can be fully argued. Moving 
beyond the notion of equality as a second-order principle requires the 
Court to develop and exercise a habit of reasoning in accordance with its 
equality jurisprudence. 
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